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Executive Summary
The complex causes of the current food and agriculture crisis require a comprehensive response. 
In view of the urgency of assisting people and countries in need, the first set of policy actions—
an emergency package—consists of steps that can yield immediate impact:
1.  expand emergency responses and humanitarian assistance to food-insecure people and 
people threatening government legitimacy, 
2.  eliminate agricultural export bans and export restrictions, 
3.  undertake fast-impact food production programs in key areas, and 
4.  change biofuel policies. 
A second set of actions—a resilience package—consists of the following steps:
5.  calm markets with the use of market-oriented regulation of speculation, shared public 
grain stocks, strengthened food-import financing, and reliable food aid;
6.  invest in social protection;
7.  scale up investments for sustained agricultural growth; and 
8.  complete the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. 
Investment in these actions calls for additional resources. Policymakers should consider 
mobilizing resources from four sources: the winners from the commodity boom among countries; 
the community of traditional and new donor countries; direct or indirect progressive taxation 
and reallocation of public expenditures in the affected countries themselves; and mobilization of 
private sector finance, including through improved outreach of banking to agriculture. 
Because of countries’ diverse situations, the design of programs must be country driven and 
country owned. Accountability for sound implementation must also rest with countries. At the 
same time, a new international architecture for the governance of agriculture, food, and nutrition 
is needed to effectively implement the initiatives described, and especially their international 
public goods components. Global and national action is needed, through existing mechanisms, 
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The sharp increase in food prices over the past couple of 
years has raised serious concerns about the food and nutri-
tion situation of people around the world, especially the poor 
in developing countries; about inflation; and—in some 
countries—about civil unrest. Although the relative influence 
of various factors on global food price inflation remains 
somewhat open to discussion and debate, the underlying 
causes are increasingly well understood and noted at the 
highest policymaking levels. IFPRI drew attention to the 
problem early on and identified the main actions needed to 
prevent and mitigate the emerging crisis.2 This paper aims to 
identify more specifically what needs to be done now. The set 
of policy actions, and in particular their sequencing, scale, 
adaptation to diverse regional and national conditions, and 
the arrangements for and governance of their implementa-
tion, need frameworks and clarity. Developing- and 
developed-country governments as well as international 
organizations have key roles to play in reducing and stabi-
lizing prices by facilitating urgently needed trade and 
investment actions and in helping poor people cope with 
higher food bills through social protection. Some of these 
actions require global coordination in order to be effective. 
Nearly every agricultural commodity is part of the rising 
price trend. Since 2003, world maize and wheat prices have 
more than doubled (Figure 1). The price of rice has jumped 
to unprecedented levels and doubled in the past four months 
alone. Dairy products, meat, poultry, palm oil, and cassava, 
among other agricultural commodities, have also experienced 
price hikes. Since the beginning of 2003, the prices of butter 
and milk have tripled and the price of poultry meat has 
almost doubled. When adjusted for inflation and the dollar’s 
decline (by reporting in euros, for example), food price 
increases are smaller but still dramatic. What really matters 
for the poor, however, is the effect on their purchasing power. 
Some of this effect is reflected in the declining ratio of wages 
of unskilled labor to food prices. The high global agricultural 
prices do not appear likely to fall to their 2000–03 levels, and 
fluctuations may be even higher, according to the global 
scenario analysis of the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI).3 
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The surge in food prices has been transmitted in varying 
degrees from international to local markets.4 For example, in 
Tanzania, 81 percent of the change in international maize 
prices between 2003 and 2008 has been captured by local 
price changes. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the transmis-
sion of maize prices is -5 percent in Jakarta and 32 percent in 
Surabaya. Similarly, in Ghana and the Philippines local rice 
prices have adjusted to around 50 percent of the world price 
change. The food price surge also has a direct impact on 
overall inflation because the weight of food in the consump-
tion baskets is high. In Latin America, where the share of 
food in the consumer price index ranges from 23 to 50 
percent, food inflation has reached double digits. Food price 
inflation has also picked up in China, where it now contrib-
utes to about 90 percent of overall inflation. In India the 
contribution of food price inflation to overall inflation has 
been less than 20 percent during 2007–08, yet it has created 
political concerns in the Parliament. India has used its 
subsidy, trade, and tariff policies to absorb much of the shock 
in global food and energy prices. The least-developed 
countries, however, many of which are in Africa, have fewer 
resources to respond in a similar manner. 
National governments and international actors are taking 
various steps to try to minimize the effects of higher interna-
tional prices on domestic prices and to mitigate impacts on 
particular groups. Some of these actions are likely to help 
stabilize and reduce food prices, whereas others may help 
certain groups at the expense of others or actually make food 
prices more volatile and seriously distort trade. What is 
needed is more effective and coherent action to help the most 
vulnerable populations cope with the drastic and immediate 
hikes in their food bills, to help developing-country farmers 
swiftly respond to the opportunity posed by the rising 
demand for their products, and to bring more stability to 
highly volatile food markets. 
II. Sources and Features of the Price Increases
The combination of new and ongoing forces is driving the 
world food situation and, in turn, the prices of food com-
modities. Rising energy prices and subsidized biofuel 
production, income and population growth, globalization, 
2 See www.ifpri.org and, for example, Joachim von Braun, Mark W. Rosegrant, Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Marc J. Cohen, Sarah A. Cline, Mary Ashby Brown, and 
María Soledad Bos, New Risks and Opportunities for Food Security: Scenario Analyses for 2015 and 2050, 2020 Discussion Paper 39 (Washington, DC: IFPRI, 
February 2005); Joachim von Braun, The World Food Situation: New Driving Forces and Required Actions, Food Policy Report (Washington, DC: IFPRI, 
December 2007).
3 IFPRI’s global scenario analysis is based on the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT). This modeling 
activity is instrumental for IFPRI’s outlook. It is directed by Mark W. Rosegrant.
4 Certain elements can prevent a perfect transmission of prices from international markets to local markets. Three forces are normally identified: (1) transpor-
tation cost and natural market segmentation; (2) domestic policies and discretionary market segmentation; and (3) imperfect transmission related to market 
structure and the existence of monopolistic/monopsonistic power. As a result the transmission of price changes from international to local markets varies 
between countries.3
and urbanization are among the major forces contributing to 
surging demand. On the supply side, land and water con-
straints, underinvestment in rural infrastructure and 
agricultural innovation, lack of access to inputs, and weather 
disruptions are impairing productivity growth and the 
needed production response. Between 2000 and 2007, cereal 
demand exceeded cereal production, and cereal stocks have 
consequently declined. Demand for agricultural commodities 
for food, feed, and fuel is likely to continue to escalate. 
Climate change risks and rising energy demand could 
re-accelerate food prices in the future. Ad hoc market and 
trade policies such as export bans and import subsidies add 
further volatility in the international food market. It is 
important to keep in mind that the factors playing a role in 
the current crisis vary in nature—some are cyclical, some are 
structural, and some are unique—and can change, as shown 
by tales of previous commodity booms, like the one in 1974.
2. 1. Energy and biofuels
One key factor behind rising food prices is the greatly 
increased price of energy. Energy and agricultural prices have 
become increasingly intertwined (Figure 1). With oil prices 
at an all-time high of more than US$120 a barrel in May 
2008 and with the U.S. government and the European 
Union subsidizing agriculture-based energy, farmers have 
massively shifted their cultivation toward crops for biofuel. 
In the United States, as much as one third of the maize crop 
goes to ethanol production, up from 5 percent a decade ago, 
and biofuel subsidies range between US$11 billion and 
US$13 billion a year. In addition, the large agricultural 
subsidies in developed countries have for years distorted 
markets and undercut the competitive advantage of 
developing-country farmers.
Expanded production of biofuels such as ethanol and 
biodiesel has a strong effect on prices because biofuel produc-
tion draws largely on agricultural products. Increased biofuel 
demand in 2000–07 is estimated to have contributed to 30 
percent of the weighted average increase of cereal prices. 
Incorporating new developments in supply and demand as 
well as actual biofuel investment plans, IFPRI’s IMPACT 
projects that real prices of maize and oilseeds in 2020 will be 
26 and 18 percent higher compared with a scenario that 
keeps biofuel production at 2007 levels. These are conserva-
tive estimates that do not factor in speculation and triggered 
trade restrictions (export bans). Also, future oil prices will 
factor heavily in the actual price changes, because a higher oil 
Sources: International commodity prices database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), 2008; International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), April 2008. 
Note: Although there is a strong correlation between food price levels and oil price levels, this is not the only  
forceful relationship. Other factors, such as high demand for food due to economic growth and lack of response in 
production, play a role in food price increases as well. 































Oil (right scale)respond. Farmers in Brazil, China, and India may be able to 
respond quickly owing to relatively strong infrastructure, 
services, and government capacity. Farmers in Africa, 
however, may be left further behind. In some regions, such as 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia, the current high 
grain prices are attracting substantial foreign direct invest-
ments combined with technical, management, and marketing 
assistance in the agricultural sector, but the production 
response has yet to be seen.  
The production response to high prices is impeded by 
land and water constraints, as well as by underinvestment in 
agricultural innovation and deficient agricultural banking. 
Land available for cultivation is limited, and the cost of 
bringing new land into production (including the environ-
mental cost) can be high.6 For instance, focus group 
discussions with farmers in Bangladesh in April 2008 reveal 
that even many marginal farmers and landless laborers have 
leased small pieces of land using cash that they borrowed at 
annual interest rates as high as 240 percent.7 And some of 
them borrowed cash from nontraditional moneylenders such 
as shopkeepers, friends, relatives, and neighbors. Some 
landless laborers temporarily migrated to cities to earn money 
as rickshaw pullers to pay for inputs such as irrigation water 
and fertilizers. The financing of such food security actions by 
the poor needs further attention, and an expanded role of 
microfinance for investment as well as for temporary con-
sumption credit should be considered.  
Climate change will pose further threats to agricultural 
production in the long term, and weather conditions are 
currently an increasingly critical factor for prices and farmer 
risks. Adverse climate conditions (drought, excessive rain, 
flood, windstorm, frost, hail, sunburn, snow; pest and disease 
attack; and fire) can significantly disturb production and 
deplete farmers’ assets. There is a need for an innovative 
response to the age-old policy problem of how to safeguard 
smallholders against weather-related income shocks—one 
example is the new generation of weather insurance systems. 
Crop insurance schemes increasingly cover high-value 
agriculture products in some developing countries, but 
extending these schemes to cereals would stimulate invest-
ment in the small-farm sector and stabilize incomes. 
Accelerated innovation is needed to address the chal-
lenges; research and guaranteed output prices will be of 
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price will increase demand for biofuels and put a further 
squeeze on food supplies, unless biofuel policies are changed.  
High energy prices have also made agricultural produc-
tion more expensive by raising the cost of inputs like 
fertilizers, irrigation, and transport of inputs and outputs. 
Whereas the share of energy in the cost of crop production is 
around 4 percent in most developing countries, it is between 
8 and 20 percent in some large countries such as Brazil, 
China, and India.
2. 2.  Income and population growth
Many parts of the developing world continue to face high 
population growth, and an increasing number of countries 
have experienced high economic growth in recent years. 
Developing Asia, especially China and India, continues to 
show strong sustained growth. Real gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the region increased by more than 9 percent a year 
between 2005 and 2007. Sub-Saharan Africa also experi-
enced rapid economic growth of more than 6 percent in the 
same period. Even countries with high incidences and 
prevalences of hunger reported strong growth rates. With 
higher incomes, shifting rural-urban populations, and 
changing preferences, domestic consumer demand for food 
has increased. At the same time, the growing world popula-
tion is demanding more and different kinds of food. Food 
consumption patterns are shifting from grains and other 
staple crops to vegetables, fruits, meat, and dairy, and this 
consumption cuts into land and water use for grains.
2. 3. Agricultural production
On the supply side, the global production response to rising 
demand has been slow. Production has grown only slowly in 
some traditionally grain-surplus and grain-exporting coun-
tries. Output declined in Australia owing to severe drought 
and stagnated in China, the European Union, India, and the 
United States. Some recovery is expected in 2008, but overall 
productivity growth in agriculture along past trends is simply 
too low to cope with the increase in demand. In most regions 
that have already reached high levels of production and trade, 
yields have been growing very slowly. 
Typically, global agriculture supply increases by 1 to 2 
percent when prices increase by 10 percent.5 In the new high-
price situation, it is not clear how strongly farmers will 
5 Conclusions based on past analyses with data from the 1980s and 1990s must be interpreted cautiously because the elasticities should be expected to be  
non-linear.
6 It is questionable how much arable land is available in practice and at what cost for future agricultural expansion. According to the FAO, twice as much land 
as that currently farmed is available for rainfed production. Much of the potential land, however, is in practice unavailable (forests, protected areas, human 
settlements, and infrastructure) or difficult to cultivate. Compared with 1997–99, arable land is projected to increase by 15 percent by 2015 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and 10 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is projected to stay constant in East and South Asia (FAO, World Agriculture: Towards 
2015/2030 [Rome: 2003]). In certain developed countries, especially in Europe, if policies regarding “set-aside” lands are changed, a bigger supply response is 
possible. In certain developing countries, such as India, increased irrigation investments can increase agricultural production by raising cropping intensity.
7 Field observations by Akhter Ahmed (IFPRI) and DATA team, Dhaka, Bangladesh, April 2008. 5
critical importance for increasing yields. The South Asian 
Green Revolution experience shows that farm yields can 
double or even triple in a few years if modern seeds, irriga-
tion, and fertilizers are combined with assured output prices. 
But growth in global public agricultural research and devel-
opment (R&D) expenditures has slowed around the world 
and even declined during the 1990s in developed countries. 
Favorable weather and rising agricultural production in 
the coming years could overcome the acute price crisis and 
allow for some rebuilding of stocks. It is also possible that 
production could overshoot demand, and policymakers 
should plan for the stabilization of food markets in this 
direction as well. 
2. 4. Market and trade policy
Many countries are taking ad hoc steps, such as export 
restrictions and price controls, to try to minimize the effects 
of higher prices on their populations. As of April 2008, 15 
countries,8 including major producers, had imposed export 
restrictions on agricultural commodities. For instance, China 
has banned rice and maize exports, and India has banned 
exports of rice and pulses. Argentina has raised export taxes 
on soybeans, maize, wheat, and beef, and Ethiopia and 
Tanzania have banned exports of major cereals. Among the 
countries imposing new or additional price controls are 
Benin, China, Malaysia, and Senegal. 
These steps can add up to policy failures. Policy 
responses such as export bans or high export tariffs may 
reduce risks of food shortages in the short term for the 
relevant country, but they are likely to backfire by making the 
international market smaller and more volatile. Export 
restrictions have harmful effects on import-dependent 
trading partners. For example, export restrictions on rice in 
India affect Bangladeshi consumers adversely and also 
dampen the incentives for rice farmers in India to invest in 
agriculture, which is a long-term driver of growth. In 
addition, export bans stimulate the formation of cartels, 
undermine trust in trade, and encourage protectionism. At 
the country level, price controls can also backfire by reducing 
farmers’ incentives to produce more food and diverting 
resources away from those who need them most.
Other countries have contributed to the expansion of 
global food demand. Some net food-importing developing 
countries, for example, have reduced import barriers—in 
principle a welcome move toward more open trade but in 
practice a factor in the upward pressure on prices. Morocco 
has cut tariffs on wheat imports from 130 to 2.5 percent, 
Nigeria has slashed duties on rice imports from 100 to 2.7 
percent, Peru has removed import taxes on wheat and maize, 
and Senegal has waived duties on cereal imports.
The increases in food prices now have a dominant role in 
increasing inflation in many countries. It would be inappro-
priate to address these specific inflation causes with general 
macroeconomic instruments such as monetary and interest 
rate policies, which have the potential to trigger a general 
slowdown and make the economic situation even worse. But 
the restrictive agricultural trade policies adopted by several 
developing countries also undermine the benefits of global 
integration, adding to the distortions already created by rich 
countries’ longstanding trade policies. Agricultural globaliza-
tion is put in “reverse gear,” with adverse effects for the 
poorest nations. The WTO Doha Round still needs to be 
completed, and it would be a damaging side effect if the 
current crisis were to divert attention from that goal. Rule-
based, fair, and free international trade is particularly needed 
in times of crisis, as the export ban problems underline. 
2. 5. Speculation and market fundamentals
Formation of the actual food commodity prices is a result of 
real market conditions of supply relative to demand, expecta-
tions of future prices, and speculative participation in the 
market (including manipulative interventions). Thus there 
are three categories of “speculators”—(1) governments, 
farmers, households, small traders, and others whose specula-
tion is not a major factor under normal conditions, but 
whose actions can add up to have large effects in a price 
crisis; (2) commercial traders who are hedging in futures 
markets and providing a useful risk management function; 
and (3) noncommercial traders who are seeking profits 
through speculation. Supply and demand fundamentals do 
not fully explain the recent drastic increase in food prices. 
Rising expectations, speculation, hoarding, and hysteria are 
among the additional factors that have played a role in the 
increasing level and volatility of food prices. 
Yet speculation is mainly a symptom, not a major source 
of the current price crisis. The so-called speculators, as 
broadly defined here, actually include governments that react 
in excessively precautionary ways, small and large traders, 
farmers, and consumers that hedge informally and build up 
some storage. In Bangladesh, for instance, rice traders started 
releasing their speculative paddy (unhusked rice) and rice 
stocks in April 2008 in the market mainly in anticipation of 
a very good upcoming Boro paddy harvest and in response to 
the government’s plans to build up its stocks by procuring a 
large quantity of Boro rice as it is harvested and as rice 
imports arrive.9 
8 Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zambia.
9 Although India promised to export rice to Bangladesh earlier in 2008 despite its recently imposed ban on rice exports, the imports from India have yet to 
arrive.The flow of speculative capital from financial investors 
into agricultural commodity markets has been a factor too. In 
the first quarter of 2008, the volume of globally traded grain 
futures and options increased by 32 percent compared with 
the same period in 2007.10 The possibility cannot be excluded 
that “hot money” from the collapsing housing market has 
found its way into commodity markets, including the market 
for food futures. But there is no precise information on or 
analysis of the impact of speculative funds on food prices. 
Low levels of stocks and ill-designed public policies foster 
speculation by many actors. Excessive speculation in the 
commodity futures market could, in principle, push up 
futures prices and spot prices (through arbitrage opportuni-
ties) above levels justified by fundamentals. Speculation is 
sometimes confused with hedging against risks, however, 
which stem from genuine concern about future supply and 
demand. Although commercial traders mainly enter into 
future markets for hedging purposes, noncommercial traders 
mainly speculate in search of financial profits.11 The latter is 
not necessarily harmful because it indicates some investment 
opportunities in the agricultural sector. The countries 
imposing export controls, however, are indirectly harming 
the operational efficiency of the futures markets. In addition, 
in some countries, such as India, political forces are 
demanding that several agricultural commodities be sus-
pended from futures trading. 
Grain reserves could be used to prevent speculative 
attacks and correct for the misalignment between the under-
lying physical market and the futures market. Global cereal 
stocks, however—especially wheat—are at their lowest levels 
since the early 1980s. 
III. The Impacts of High Food Prices on  
the Poor
Higher food prices have radically different effects across 
countries and population groups. At the country level, 
countries that are net food exporters benefit from improved 
terms of trade, although some of them are missing out on 
this opportunity by banning exports to protect consumers. 
Net food importers, however, struggle to meet domestic food 
demand. Given that most countries in Africa are net 
importers of cereals, they are hard hit by rising prices. At the 
household level, surging and volatile food prices hit hardest 
those who can afford it the least—the poor, including the 
160 million ultra poor, who have incomes of less than half a 
dollar a day, and the food and nutrition insecure. The few 
poor households that are net sellers of food benefit from 
higher prices, but households that are net buyers of food are 
harmed. The net food buyers represent most of the world’s 
poor and include the overwhelming majority of the urban 
poor. Adjustments in the rural economy through wages and 
capital inflows, which can create new income opportunities, 
will take time to reach the poor and vulnerable. Also, there is 
a real risk that large numbers of vulnerable people who had 
managed to escape absolute poverty in recent years will be 
unable to cope with the shock of rapidly rising food prices 
and will fall back into poverty. 
Progress toward achieving the poverty and hunger 
Millennium Development Goal is compromised for some 
time to come. Progress on the goal of cutting hunger in half 
was disappointing even before the price increases set in. Three 
malign effects are of particular concern: (1) deterioration of 
the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and of 
preschool children; (2) the withdrawal of children, especially 
girls, from school; and (3) the distress sale of productive 
assets. All three have potentially irreversible consequences and 
compromise the future ability of individuals and households 
to escape poverty. For example, malnutrition that leads to 
stunting in preschool children directly affects their ability to 
learn in school and thus their ability to earn income as adults. 
The food security and nutrition of the poor are at risk 
when they are not shielded from the price rises. Higher food 
prices lead poor people to limit their food consumption and 
shift to even less-balanced diets, with potentially harmful 
effects on their nutritional status and health in the short and 
long run. At the household level, it is common for the poor 
in developing countries to spend 50 to 70 percent of their 
budget on food, and a large proportion of the food budget 
on staple foods. Further, the poor tend to have remarkably 
monotonous diets, getting the vast majority of their caloric 
intake from staple crops and consuming little in the way of 
animal-source foods, fruits, or vegetables, which are rich in 
essential micronutrients. 
Because of their economic circumstances, poor house-
holds are more responsive to changes in food prices than the 
wealthy, but there are variations across countries in the 
magnitude of this sensitivity. In Bangladesh rice accounts for 
30 percent of total household expenditures and 48 percent of 
total food expenditures of the poor, which gives few options 
to adjust. In Vietnam the majority of the poor are found in 
rural areas, but because land holdings are relatively equitable, 
the adverse effects of higher rice prices in rural Vietnam are 
largely offset by the increased incomes these households 
receive for their rice production. By contrast, in Malawi, 
6
10 Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), A Global Trading Summary of Grain and Oilseed Markets (Chicago: March 2008).
11 In the past six months, the total number of long positions (that is, obligations to buy) by noncommercial traders as a fraction of the total reportable long 
positions by commercial and noncommercial traders for maize, wheat, soybeans, and rice has significantly increased, suggesting the possibility of a price 
bubble above what is justifiable by market fundamentals.Zambia, and most Central American countries, higher maize 
prices adversely affect the poor in both urban and rural areas 
because even in rural areas, the poor tend to be net con-
sumers of maize. In Nigeria poor or even lower-middle- 
income households are consuming less meat, rice, and maize 
and more cassava and yam as a response to the current food 
price increase. Overall, as prices continue to rise, the poor 
will experience a worsening of dietary quality and micronu-
trient intake, and the very poor will also experience decreased 
caloric intake.  
Higher food prices not only lead to the deterioration of 
diets, but also significantly erode households’ purchasing 
power. This loss affects the purchase of other goods and 
services essential for the health and welfare of household 
members, including heating, lighting, water, sanitation, 
education, and health care, all of which are important inputs 
into nutrition. The choices of coping mechanisms that poor 
households make will ultimately determine the severity of the 
impact of high food prices on their livelihoods and on the 
well-being of their members in the short, medium, and long 
term. Similarly, their access to social safety nets and other 
social protection schemes will also be a key determinant of 
the level of suffering they will experience. Productive safety 
nets that combine social transfers with production, such as 
public works, in many countries still reach only a small 
proportion of the poorest population. Ethiopia’s safety net 
program, for example, which reaches 8 million people, covers 
approximately 25 percent of the poor. In Bangladesh—a 
country where 25 percent of the population is ultra poor—
roughly 7 percent of the population has access to social 
protection or safety net programs.
People not only passively respond to food price inflation, 
but also increasingly turn to street protests and riots. The 
poorest suffer silently for a while, but the middle class 
typically has the ability to organize, lobby, and protest early 
on. Between early 2007 and May 2008, social unrest related 
to high food prices occurred in 30 countries.12 Food price 
inflation has become a sensitive political and security issue.  
IV.  Proposed Policy Actions 
The complex causes of the food and agriculture crisis require 
a comprehensive response. This situation calls for an interna-
tional pact to achieve food and nutrition security with 
elements of global, regional, and national actions, all of 
which have shorter- and longer-term dimensions and need 
adequate sequencing. The actions proposed here are derived 
from the preceding analyses of the causes and consequences 
of the price increases and thus aim to address the acute 
human consequences of suffering among the poor and the 
current and past policy deficiencies that created and acceler-
ated the crisis. 
The obvious signals of the crisis are the drastic price 
increases and riots. That “information” is not enough, 
however, to point the way to sound policy actions. 
Governments and affected people need to be informed about 
the causes and implications of the current and emerging 
situation. The current developments have brought to the 
forefront the importance of food information systems. 
Appropriate monitoring mechanisms at the global, regional, 
and national levels will facilitate better responses. Such 
information must be available for decisionmakers on a regular 
basis and not only when a perceived problem has actually 
become acute. Although the urgency of the current food 
situation does not permit decisionmakers to wait for compre-
hensive information systems to be established before acting, 
coordinated information collection and sharing is needed to 
facilitate action.13
Although the current situation poses policy challenges on 
several fronts, there are effective and coherent actions that 
can be taken to help vulnerable people through humanitarian 
aid, trade, investment, and social protection policies. Some of 
these actions require international coordination, including 
the attention of the G8+5,14 to work. 
In view of the urgency of assisting people and countries 
in need, the policy actions suggested here are listed in two 
sets: an emergency package of actions to take immediately 
and a resilience package of actions to phase in now but whose 
impacts may take time. These actions do not mix general 
development policy agendas with the needed response to the 
current food price crisis, but actions that promise longer-term 
impact are nevertheless highly relevant. A focus on short-term 
crisis mitigation alone would fail to address the root problems 
and to bring the needed resilience into the food system. 
This approach leads to eight major actions, all of which 
require immediate attention but whose impacts on the poor, 
on agriculture, and on the economy as a whole will differ 
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12 Argentina, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, United 
Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
13 Such monitoring systems would include basic food consumption information, such as the prevalence of people forced to move from three meals a day to two 
or one; standardized household accounts (by rural and urban household groups and income classes) that can be used to assess price and income shocks; child 
weight-for-height information, which can indicate already acute problems; and expected crop production and changes in stocks.
14 These are the Group of Eight countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus the five leading 
emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa).over time, ranging from immediate to future impacts. The 
first set of actions—the emergency package—will address 
immediate needs for food assistance and increased food 
availability. The second set of actions—the resilience 
package—will address the need to build a more resilient food 
system that can meet ongoing and future challenges. 
The eight policy actions proposed are the following:
A.  The emergency package
1.  Expand emergency responses and humanitarian 
assistance. An urgent global response must include 
increased resources for humanitarian agencies. World 
preparedness to take action on food price crises must 
be improved. National emergency agencies typically 
respond to natural disasters and complex humani-
tarian emergencies but not to slow-onset disasters  
like this price crisis. This pattern must change. 
Emergency agencies need to adopt triggers that will 
activate them under crises like the current one. They 
need to invest more in preparedness and mobilize 
their often strong capabilities to monitor and assist 
the population groups that need to be targeted. 
National emergency agencies also need to collaborate 
with organizations that deal with chronic food, 
agriculture, and nutrition issues at the national level, 
similar to the effort now being pursued by the United 
Nations to improve global cooperation on food 
issues, with an important role for the World Food 
Programme (WFP). Given the nature of the price 
crisis, decisionmakers must give due attention to the 
urban poor. Food or cash transfers should be 
expanded and should target the poorest people, with 
a focus on early childhood nutrition, regions in 
distress, school feeding with take-home rations, and 
food and cash for work. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and civil society organizations have an 
important role to play in the related actions. 
What could be expected from these measures? 
Targeted transfers will protect the food consumption 
levels of people served by existing programs. 
Increased funding would prevent further deteriora-
tion of food and nutrition security and increase 
emergency preparedness.
Who would be the key actors? The UN, donors 
(for financing), humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and 
civil society organizations. 
Where is this action most relevant? Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean.
2.  Eliminate agricultural export bans. The export bans 
among developing countries have created a new trade 
policy theater (see Section 2.4). Governments have a 
legitimate interest in caring for their citizens first. 
Hence there should be no illusion: the problem of 
export bans cannot be addressed country by country. 
Although the new wave of export restrictions requires 
urgent international attention, this issue should not 
be added to the WTO Doha Round. Instead, it 
should be addressed by an ad hoc forum of global 
players negotiating according to a code of conduct 
and in a spirit of mutual trust building. At the very 
least, export trade for humanitarian purposes should 
be reopened now even before a forum is convened. 
What could be expected from these measures?  
The elimination of export bans will stabilize grain 
price fluctuations, reduce price levels by as much as 
30 percent,15 and enhance the efficiency of 
agricultural production.
Who would be the key actors?  G8+5 and 
subregional organizations. 
Where is this action most relevant?  Global impact; 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America. 
3.  Undertake fast-impact food production programs 
in key areas. Short-term action to promote 
agricultural growth requires access to seeds, fertilizers, 
and credit for the small farm sector—in other words, 
the traditional “Green Revolution” package (see 
Section 2.3). Today, good seeds for rainfed 
agriculture, especially in Africa, are essential for 
expanding production. Also, small farmers should 
have access to procurement programs for their 
agricultural products at guaranteed minimum prices 
that reflect long-term international market prices.16 
Carefully subsidized programs for seeds, fertilizers, 
irrigation, electricity, and water should involve the 
private sector from the beginning and facilitate a 
transition from initial “crash programs” to market-
based arrangements. Such subsidized programs 
should be focused on and limited to least-developed 
countries. The timing of these actions is crucial for 
15 These IFPRI modeling results from the MIRAGE model should be taken as a conservative estimate. IFPRI models factor in neither speculation over and 
above market fundamentals nor the increased price impacts of any quantity change in the much narrower international market.
16 This procurement should not involve support pricing of a protectionist nature, but rather assurance of stable output prices.
8achieving a rapid production stimulus for smallholder 
agriculture and the small business sector serving 
agriculture. Banking and finance are also critical for 
success. These short-term programs should have 
clearly defined and communicated exit strategies. 
Even though the production response should be 
quick, it needs to be driven largely by higher yields 
rather than area expansion (see Section 2.3). 
Programs that set aside agricultural resources in 
industrialized countries, except in well-defined 
conservation areas, should be terminated where this 
has not already been done. 
What could be expected from these measures? 
Fast-impact production programs would jump-start 
agricultural growth in the short term, create income-
earning opportunities in the crisis, and lower prices.
Who would be the key actors? Donors, regional 
organizations such as the African Union and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
NGOs, and civil society organizations. 
Where is this action most relevant? Sub-Saharan 
Africa and some selected Asian countries.
4.  Change biofuel policies. A range of measures should 
be considered to make more grains and oilseeds 
currently used for fuel available for food and feed. 
These measures include freezing biofuel production 
at current levels, reducing it, or imposing a morato-
rium for biofuels based on grains and oilseeds (that 
is, temporarily suspending the use of grains and 
oilseeds for biofuel production) until prices come 
down to reasonable levels according to long-run 
supply and demand. Such a moratorium is not 
costless; it might require compensating investors that 
were led into this fast-expanding sector as a result of 
current policies. At the same time, more support 
should go toward developing bioenergy technologies 
that do not compete with food. 
What could be expected from these measures? A 
grain-based biofuels moratorium would quickly 
unlock grains and oilseeds for food. This measure 
might bring maize prices down by about 20 percent 
and, as a consequence, decrease wheat prices by about 
10 percent.17 Price reductions could also be generated 
by removing blending mandates, import tariffs, and 
biofuel blending subsidies in the United States and 
Europe.
Who would be the key actors? Countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and others that have moved 
heavily into grain- and oilseed-based biofuels.
Where is this action most relevant? Global impact; 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America. 
B. The resilience package
5.  Calm markets with market-oriented regulation of 
speculation, shared public grain stocks, strength-
ened food import financing, and reliable food aid. 
Speculation is mainly a consequence, not a cause, of 
the price crisis, so overregulation and market policing 
would be inappropriate responses. Surveillance and 
regulatory measures, however, such as monitoring 
speculative capital or limiting futures trading,18 
should be taken to curb excessive speculation in 
agricultural commodity markets. 
Under the current tight market conditions, it is 
infeasible to accumulate a global stock of grain that 
would bring the desired calming effect into the 
markets. The needed incremental supply is missing. 
Agreements on joint pooling of fixed portions of 
national stocks at the regional or global level would 
seem feasible, however. A coordinated set of pledges 
for a modest grain reserve to be made by the main 
grain-producing countries (including coordinated 
releases from the reserve for regional emergencies 
when prices increase excessively over what market 
fundamentals indicate) should be established at 
global or regional levels. A global intelligence 
network should inform the management of these 
international coordinated reserves.  
The Food Aid Convention should be renegoti-
ated and reformed, while current grain delivery and 
cash commitments should be expanded. An accom-
panying option could be a finance facility, provided 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for 
imports by countries in food emergencies. 
What could be expected from this initiative? The 
pooling of global or regional public stocks, comple-
mented by an import-financing facility, would allow 
countries with greater food deficits in a particular 
17 These are conservative estimates; in a tight market the price decrease will be greater.
18 Policymakers could set maximum limits on trading positions, increasing the margin deposit requirements to minimize speculative capital.
9region to gain access to food supplies at reasonable 
and stable prices in times of crisis. It would also help 
contain the speculative expectations that fuel further 
price rises during the upswing. But such reserves have 
costs, depending upon their size, which need to be 
carefully weighed against potential benefits. 
Who are the key actors? The IMF, OECD countries, 
subregional organizations, and commodity exchanges.
Where is this action most relevant? Asia (for rice), 
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and 
the Middle East.  
6.  Invest in social protection. Comprehensive social 
protection initiatives are required to address the risks 
facing the poor due to reduced access to food as a 
consequence of high prices (see Section III). A 
hierarchy of appropriate social protection interven-
tions includes both protective actions to mitigate 
short-term risks and preventative actions to preclude 
long-term negative consequences. Introducing or 
scaling up these interventions is complex, associated 
with substantial costs, and dependent on knowledge 
base and capacity.  
At the core of the protective actions are condi-
tional cash transfer programs, pension systems, and 
employment programs. These programs exist in many 
low-income countries and should be scaled up. 
Where such interventions do not exist, targeted cash 
transfer programs should be introduced in the short 
term. If food markets function poorly or are absent, 
however, providing food is a better option than 
providing cash.
Microfinance, which includes both credit and 
savings, is also advisable to permit the poor to avoid 
drastic actions such as distress sales of productive 
assets that can permanently damage their future 
earning potential. The large global networks of 
microfinance institutions should consider responding 
to the price crisis by temporarily loosening repayment 
conditions, as the poor need access to food consump-
tion credit and debt relief. 
Preventative health and nutrition programs 
targeted to vulnerable population groups (such as 
mothers, young children, and people living with 
HIV/AIDS) should be strengthened and scaled up to 
ensure universal coverage. This measure is essential to 
prevent the long-term consequences of malnutrition 
on lifelong health and economic productivity. In 
addition, school feeding programs can play an 
important role in increasing school enrollment, 
retaining children in school, and enhancing their 
academic achievement. 
Interventions should be coordinated with the 
emergency actions already mentioned (action 1). 
Many of these actions must take place at the national 
level, but many countries lack the resources to 
implement them. Donors should expand support for 
such programs in conjunction with sound public 
expenditure reviews.
What could be expected from these measures? These 
steps can prevent the long-term adverse consequences 
of early childhood malnutrition, protect the assets of 
the poor, and maintain school participation rates. 
Who would be the key actors? The UN, national 
governments, donors, NGOs, and civil society 
organizations. 
Where is this action most relevant? Asia, Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the 
Middle East.
7.  Scale up investments for sustained agricultural 
growth. To transform the crisis into an opportunity 
for farmers and to build resilience to future food 
crises, a transition to viable long-term investments in 
support of sustained agricultural growth is urgently 
needed. Such investments are particularly needed in 
view of the emerging stress factors for agriculture 
from climate change that threaten to perpetuate the 
current crisis. Investments for sustained agricultural 
growth include expanded public spending for rural 
infrastructure, services, agricultural research, science, 
and technology. 
New and innovative crop insurance mechanisms 
should be introduced and tested at a larger scale. 
Information technology, improved weather data, and 
the expected high returns to insurance make 
innovation in this field now much more feasible. 
Developed countries should facilitate the sharing 
of agricultural innovation and research that are 
relevant to enhancing productivity and transforming 
small-farm agriculture. A scaled-up Consultative 
Group on International Research (CGIAR) has a key 
role to play in expanding global and national 
agricultural research systems geared to poor small-
scale farmers. 
The recently expanded investments in agriculture 
in, for instance, China and India must be sustained at 
high levels. Also, African leaders must implement 
their commitment to allocate 10 percent of their 
budgets to agriculture as soon as possible in order to 
achieve much-needed agricultural growth to meet 
poverty and hunger reduction targets. 
10The needed supply response is not just a matter 
of the farm-level expansion of production, but must 
comprise the whole food value chain, with private 
sector actors in the food-processing and retail 
industries playing key roles. New—and much 
broader—concepts of corporate social responsibility 
are called for.
What could be expected from these measures? These 
investments would have high returns not only in 
terms of agricultural growth, but also in terms of 
poverty reduction in both rural and urban areas 
through increased production and employment and 
lower food prices. 
Who would be the key actors? Donors, regional 
organizations, OECD countries, foundations, and 
the private sector. 
Where is this action most relevant? Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
8.  Complete the WTO Doha Round. The completion 
of the WTO Doha Round is even more relevant in 
times of high food prices in order to strengthen 
rule-based trade. A world short in supply and facing 
regional and country-specific fluctuations needs more 
options to trade, not less. 
It should be easier for countries to agree to lower 
agricultural tariffs when market prices, especially for 
sensitive commodities, are high. With high global 
food prices, there may be no need to provide large 
domestic support or export subsidies to farmers in 
developed countries. The EU has already eliminated 
its applied tariffs on cereals, but it has not yet 
decreased its bound tariffs, which means that there is 
no certainty about these levels in the long term. 
Similarly, U.S. farmers are holding tight to low loan 
rates and countercyclical payment programs despite 
the fact that they are projected to benefit little from 
them in the coming years. Policymakers in developed 
countries want to keep their options open in case 
prices fall. The current food situation should be 
viewed, however, as an opportunity to introduce 
major changes in the agriculture negotiations per-
taining to market access, domestic support, and 
export subsidies.
What could be expected from these measures? If 
these opportunities are realized, they would lead to 
more fair and open trade, more efficient resource use, 
and higher welfare for people in developing coun-
tries. They would also have a stabilizing effect on 
agricultural prices and help prevent future crises. 
Who would be the key actors? The WTO and 
OECD countries. 
Where is this action most relevant? Global impact; 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. 
V. Resource Mobilization and Implementation
The humanitarian, economic, political, and security benefits 
of the proposed actions are huge and can hardly be calculated 
in monetary terms. This brief therefore makes no attempt to 
compile the costs of these needed actions. The pledges so far 
made by international agencies, however—as significant and 
important as they are—seem far below the needs, especially 
for the actions outlined under the “resilience package.” 
Investment in these actions calls for additional interna-
tional resources and reallocation of resources at the national 
level. More international development assistance is needed to 
implement actions in low-income countries that lack both 
strong implementation capacity and resources for transfers to 
the poor and for investment. And where should these 
additional resources come from? Four domains should be 
considered for resource mobilization:  
1.  The countries that are large winners from the 
commodity boom should be confronted with the 
ethical call to share their new wealth with the 
poorest. Although such a step is partly a call for 
charity, it is also a sound use of capital for long run 
investment. These winners include not only oil- and 
mineral-rich countries, but also countries rich in 
agricultural export potential. 
2.  The community of wealthy donor countries—tradi-
tional and new—should expand their development 
assistance for agriculture, food, and nutrition along 
the action agenda described. 
3.  Within the affected countries—even low-income 
countries—budget reallocation and appropriate direct 
or indirect progressive taxation is needed to finance 
the mitigation of the impacts of the price crisis on  
the poor. 
4.  Most of the investment needs in agriculture will 
require mobilizing private sector finance, including 
through improved outreach of banking in rural areas, 
which requires additional support by public finance. 
Implementation of the proposed actions requires global 
and regional cooperation. The ultimate responsibility for 
responding to high prices rests at the national level. Because 
of countries’ diverse situations, the design of programs must 
be country driven and country owned, and accountability  
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for sound implementation must also rest with countries. 
Especially at the country level, prioritization and sequencing 
are crucial for successful implementation of these eight  
action points. 
The current organizational setup for agriculture, food, 
and nutrition at the international level has failed to prevent 
the crisis. A new international architecture for governance of 
agriculture, food, and nutrition is needed in order to effec-
tively implement these initiatives, and especially their 
international public goods components.19 Such a new 
architecture needs to explicitly engage the new players in the 
global food system—the private sector and civil society, 
including large foundations—together with national govern-
ments and international organizations such as the UN 
agencies. One approach might be to establish a superstruc-
ture (for example, a panel appointed by the UN leadership) 
to guide changes across the existing specialized institutions 
and organizations and their partners.  
Countries with leading roles in the global agricultural 
system—which now go beyond the United States and 
European countries to include Brazil, China, India, and 
others—must be involved. Indeed, leadership could well 
come from the developing countries, and not just the  
largest ones.  
Within governments, more structured networks could be 
created between institutions. Such steps are beginning to be 
taken in some fields, such as public health, but not much yet 
in the areas of food, agriculture, and nutrition. There is scope 
to form innovative government networks and strengthen 
government-to-government systems for decisionmaking in 
agriculture, food, and nutrition. 
Although governance reform for agriculture, food, and 
nutrition needs to be on the agenda as part of the described 
“resilience package,” the acute situation does not permit 
decisionmakers to wait for such reform. Global and national 
action is needed now, through existing mechanisms, well-
coordinated special initiatives, and possibly a special fund. 
VI. Outlook
Continued population growth, expanding demand due to 
income growth, and emerging climate change point to the 
future challenges for agriculture production. Without deep 
action now, the current food price crisis merely foreshadows 
the events of coming decades. The high agricultural prices 
imply a fundamental revaluation of agricultural production 
and the natural resources it depends on, especially land and 
water. The challenge is to soundly manage the transition to 
the new economics of agriculture and the food system and to 
facilitate stable supplies and prices that offer long-tem 
incentives for agricultural production and help protect the 
poor. Science plays a key role in this transition in the long 
run. Although long-term price trends should be allowed to 
govern resource allocation, steps should also be taken to 
reduce short-term cyclical volatility. All of these goals make 
up a complex long-term agenda. When the current crisis 
ends, policy must not return to business as usual. If it does, 
the next crisis will hit even harder. 
19 See Joachim von Braun and Nurul Islam, “Toward a New Global Governance System for Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition: What Are the Options?” in 
IFPRI Forum, March 2008. 
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